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It has been over fifty years since French philosophers began 
criticizing the "starting point" (Ausgang) of Being and Time— 
specifically Heidegger's account of average everyday practices, 
practices that initially give us "access" (Zugang) to the question 
of the meaning of being. In his essay, "The Philosophy of the Am-
biguous," Alphonse de Waehlens argued Heidegger's phenomeno-
logical descriptions completely overlook the fundamental role that 
perception in particular and the body in general plays in our every-
day practices. He says, "[In] Being and Time one does not find 
thirty lines concerning the problem of perception; one does not find 
ten concerning that of the body."1 Jean-Paul Sartre amplified this 
line of criticism when he emphasized the importance of the body 
as the first point of contact that a human being has with its world, 
a contact that is prior to detached theorizing about worldly objects. 
And Maurice Merleau-Ponty was indirectly critical of Heidegger 
insofar as he acknowledged the primacy of bodily perception, par-
ticularly in terms of our spatial directionality and orientation, an 
orientation that makes it possible for us handle worldly equipment 
in the first place.2 
These early criticisms have since been developed and refined 
by English-speaking commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus,3 David 
Cerbone,4 and David Krell.5 Krell formulates the problem this way: 
Did Heidegger simply fail to see the arm of the everyday body 
rising in order to hammer shingles onto the roof, did he overlook 
the quotidian gaze directed toward the ticking watch that over-
takes both sun and moon, did he miss the body poised daily in 
its brazen car, a car equipped with a turn signal fabricated by and 
for the hand and eye of man, did he neglect the human being 
capable day-in, day-out of moving its body and setting itself in 
motion? If so, what conclusion must we draw?6 
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These criticisms suggest what is missing in Heidegger's early project 
is a recognition of how the "lived-body" (Leib) participates in shap-
ing our own understanding of being.7 Indeed, it is argued that the 
body should be regarded as an "existentiale" (Existenzial), an es-
sential structure or condition for any instance of Dasein. Acknowl-
edging the importance of these criticisms, I address the question of 
why Heidegger may have bypassed an analysis of the lived-body 
in the first place and where such an analysis might fit within the 
overall context of Heidegger's early project.8 
In this paper, I suggest an analysis of Dasein's bodily nature 
can be undertaken as "metontology" (Metontologie) or "meta-
physical ontics" (metaphysische Ontik), a term briefly introduced 
in Heidegger's 1928 Leibniz lectures, referring to a mode of ontic 
investigation already rooted in the outcome of the existential ana-
lytic of Dasein. I argue it is only after Dasein has been articulated 
as a disclosive temporal horizon—a horizon on the basis of which 
beings such as bodies can be understood—that philosophy can "re-
turn to" and "repeat" an interpretation of our bodily nature.9 This 
return can commence only after traditional assumptions concern-
ing the being of beings have been dismantled, specifically the as-
sumption that the body is to be understood exclusively as a being, a 
quantifiable, material thing. 
Dasein's Relation to the Body 
Early on in Being and Time, Heidegger provides a clue re-
garding where we should situate investigations of the body. He 
says, "One cannot think of [Dasein] as the being-present-at-hand 
of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity that 
is present-at-hand."10 For Heidegger, addressing the various ob-
jective characteristics of the body—size, weight, anatomy, biol-
ogy—is not crucial to his project. Heidegger is, of course, not de-
nying the fact that humans are bodily beings insofar as we are 
living organisms. Indeed, in his 1929-30 lectures, The Fundamen-
tal Concepts of Metaphysics, lectures devoted largely to the do-
main of biology, Heidegger claims the "living being is always an 
organism. Its organismic character is what determines the unity of 
this particular being."11 But human being (Dasein) should not be 
Metontology and the Body-Problem in Being and Time 3 
studied as if it were a living entity that is physically present. "When 
we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein'," says Heidegger, 
"we are expressing not its 'what' (as if it were a table, house, or 
tree) but its being."12 Giving an account of Dasein's bodily 'what-
ness'—understood here as the material composition of a human 
being—does not help us come to grips with the unique way of 
being human. Thus, "we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing 
a 'what' . . . its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it 
has its being to be." 1 3 Heidegger will amplify this point twenty 
years later in his "Letter on Humanism." 
The fact that physiology and physiological chemistry can sci-
entifically explain man as an organism is no proof that in this 
'organic' thing, that is, in the body scientifically explained; the 
essence of man exists.14 
To focus on the "present-at-hand" attributes of Dasein is to 
perpetuate a brand of ontology that begins with Plato and Aristotle. 
Such ontology interprets the being (ousia) of beings in terms of 
"substance," where substance—the essence that 'stands under' 
or 'underlies'—is understood in terms of enduring "presence" 
(Anwesenheit). According to Heidegger, Western philosophy has 
lapsed into "fallenness" (Verfallenheit) because it continues to 
interpret the being of humans in terms of "presence" that remains 
the same through any change in attributes. Contemporary phi-
losophers, in this regard, have largely jettisoned the immaterial 
mind or soul as the enduring being of humans and have replaced 
it with material substance that is quantifiable and causally deter-
mined. 
Heidegger suggests traditional, substance-oriented ontology pre-
supposes what is most essential to humans. Specifically, it over-
looks the ongoing activity of everyday "existence" that initially 
makes it possible to theoretically represent things in terms of sub-
stance. "The existential nature of man," says Heidegger, "is the 
reason why man can represent beings as such, and why he can be 
conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes... existence as 
the essential of man."15 Prior to detached theorizing about the es-
sential properties of things, I exist. I am practically engaged with a 
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meaningful world—understood as a relational background of equip-
ment, institutions, practices and others, and this background is al-
ready there. The essence or being of Dasein, therefore, is not to be 
found in an enduring substance. Rather, "the essence of Dasein 
lies in its existence"™ 
What is distinctive about human existence, according to 
Heidegger, is that we already embody a "vague and average" un-
derstanding of what it is to be. In short, in our everyday existence 
or "being-in-the-world," we grow into a tacit understanding of 
things; things are, for the most part, familiar and make sense to us. 
This understanding of things is not accomplished by detached star-
ing or theorizing. We understand things insofar as we pre-reflec-
tively handle, manipulate, and use them. A hammer, for instance, 
comes into being for me as a hammer insofar as I use it "in-order-
to-hammer." 
The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we 
seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relation-
ship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as 
that which it is—as equipment.17 
Against the background of a pre-given world, things show up for 
us in meaningful ways to the extent that we practically use them in 
the course of our daily activities. 
In order to get clear about how Dasein embodies a tacit under-
standing of being, Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology 
begins with an "analytic of Dasein" or "existential analytic." The 
method for his project is phenomenology which carefully describes 
how things meaningfully show up or come into being for us in the 
course of our everyday practices. The problem, however, is that 
Heidegger's descriptions of concrete existence in Being and Time 
fail to acknowledge the role of the body. Heidegger simply admits 
Dasein's '"bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own 
though we shall not treat it here."18 Critics rightly question why 
Heidegger is reluctant to offer an investigation of the practical 
skills and capacities of the body which initially give us access to 
intra-worldly beings and always accompany us in our everyday 
understanding. David Cerbone makes the point explicit: 
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Given the prominence, and indeed the priority, of practical en-
gagement with the world within Heidegger's conception of what 
it is to be human, an understanding of ourselves as embodied 
agents would seem to be a central concern, and not something 
whose treatment could be casually deferred.19 
This criticism of Being and Time can be clarified by turning to 
Edmund Husserl's distinction between two senses of the body. For 
Husserl, the "lived-body" (Leib) is not a Cartesian/Newtonian body 
(Körper), not a corporeal mass with measurable attributes.20 Ac-
cording to the Cartesian interpretation, bodies are defined in terms 
of (a) measurable weight, mass, shape, and motion, (b) occupying 
a specific spatial-temporal location, and (c) having determinate 
boundaries. Thus, rocks, trees, organisms, cultural artifacts, and 
human beings are all instances of Körper, but this definition does 
not help us understand how humans live as embodied agents in the 
world. The objectifying, quantifiable approach to understanding 
material bodies is itself derived from the perceptual, living body 
that initially orients me in the world. Heidegger will later acknowl-
edge this distinction—particularly in his 1936-37 Nietzsche lec-
tures and in his Zollikon Seminars from 1959-1971—by recogniz-
ing the limits of the interpretation of the body offered by the natural 
sciences. In his Nietzsche lectures, for example, Heidegger says: 
Our being embodied is essentially other than merely being en-
cumbered with an organism. Most of what we know from the 
natural sciences about the body and the way it embodies are 
specifications based on the established misinterpretation of the 
body as a mere natural body.21 
With the distinction between the lived-body and material body 
in place, we can begin to see why it would be misleading to say 
Dasein is a bounded material being that occupies a particular spa-
tial location. The lived-body stretches beyond corporeal limits, bind-
ing me to the nexus of tools and others that I am involved with in 
my daily activities. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty will later suggest, 
the lived-body constitutes the perceptual horizon within which I 
handle intra-worldly things, and I am always already oriented within 
this horizon. In this regard, I embody a habitual, pre-reflective "know-
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how" (können) of where things are in terms of their relations to 
other things. If I visit New York City, for example, I already em-
body a kinesthetic understanding of how to walk down a crowded 
sidewalk.22 The mind does not tell my body to move two feet to the 
left to avoid an obstacle or a pedestrian. Indeed, in the flow of my 
everyday practices, the problem of mind/body interaction dissolves 
altogether. Prior to mental deliberations, I am already woven to the 
world in terms of embodied directions of'right' and 'left', 'up' and 
'down'. My daily life is pre-shaped by this connection with the 
surrounding environment, and the connection cannot be reduced to 
observable material that can be broken down to elemental causal 
interactions.23 Thus, "Everything we call our bodiliness," says 
Heidegger in his Zollikon Seminars, "down to the last muscle 
fiber and down to the most hidden molecule of hormones, [already] 
belongs essentially to existing."24 
Consequently, it would be misleading to say Dasein is a being 
that has a material body. This runs the risk of interpreting Dasein 
in terms of the same substance categories of mind/body that 
Heidegger's project was attempting to overcome, misrepresent-
ing Dasein as the immaterial understanding of being that 'inhab-
its' the material body.25 Furthermore, it overlooks the phenomenon 
of the living body itself, a phenomenon captured in the various 
ways I am concretely involved in the world, rather than some-
thing I 'have' or possess. "We do not 'have' a body," says 
Heidegger, "rather we 'are' bodily."26 The lived-body is not a physi-
cal organism but what Heidegger will later call, the "bodying forth" 
(Leiben) of the body, which refers to our moving, perceptual en-
gagement with the world.27 Critics suggest it is this rich interpre-
tation of embodiment that helps to fully capture the sense of "be-
ing-in-the-world," and it is this interpretation that is noticeably ab-
sent in Being and Time. 
Does this absence hinder Heidegger's project of fundamental 
ontology? Again, Being and Time is not overly concerned with 
regional ontology. Thus, it does not focus on the being of various 
beings (Seiendes) such as numbers, plants, animals, or humans. 
Fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of the mean-
ing of being in general, with how any and all beings—including 
numbers, plants, animals, and humans—'can be' or emerge-into-
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presence as such in the first place. In this regard, Heidegger is 
concerned with "existentialia" the essential conditions or struc-
tures that constitute the "there" (Da), the disclosive horizon or 
"clearing (Lichtung) that allows beings to be. To this end, Dasein 
does not, at the deepest level, refer to an individual or self, rather 
human existence is to be understood as the shared activity of opening 
up a horizon of meaning on the basis of which beings can show 
up as the kinds of beings that they are. Dasein, in this sense, refers 
to "the 'there' (das 'Da'), that is, the lighting of being."28 
The Body and Temporality 
The question, for our purposes is this: Should the lived-body be 
regarded as an "existentiale" as an essential structure of this 
horizon? Heidegger lists many essential structures characteristic 
of Dasein, structures such as "being-in-the-world, in-being, being-
with, the Anyone, discoveredness, understanding, falling, and 
care."29 However, he identifies three master structures in Being 
and Time, "Situatedness" (Befindlichkeit), "Discourse" (Rede), 
and "Understanding" (Verstehen) which—taken together—underlie 
all other structures and constitute the essential conditions for dis-
closure, determining in advance beings as beings.30 Heidegger, 
however, makes it clear that uncovering these structures is "provi-
sional." Fundamental ontology must finally arrive at "temporality" 
(Zeitlichkeit) as the ultimate source of meaning, the original "hori-
zon for all understanding of being and for any way of interpreting 
it."31 Thus, for Heidegger, "the outcome of the existential analytic, 
the exposition of the ontological constitution of Dasein in its ground, 
is this: the constitution of the Dasein's being is grounded in 
temporality"^1 
On the traditional view, according to Heidegger, time has been 
understood in Aristotelian terms as a successive sequence of'now-
points' that endlessly follow one after another, where one 'now' is 
"earlier and the other later."33 This view yields "clock-time" which 
measures and organizes these 'now-points' in terms hours, days, 
months, and years. And this measurement is always accomplished 
in reference to the "present." In his 1924 Marburg lecture, The 
Concept of Time, Heidegger says: 
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The clock shows us the now, but no clock ever shows the future 
or has ever shown the past The time made accessible by a 
clock is regarded as present... past is interpreted as no-longer 
present, future as indeterminate not-yet-present.34 
Against this view, Heidegger suggests sequential clock-time is it-
self derived from and made possible by "primordial temporality." 
For Heidegger, this means the question: "What is time?" is itself ill-
conceived. The more appropriate question is: "Who is time?"3 5 
For Heidegger, primordial temporality must be understood in 
terms of human existence, and existence stretches in three direc-
tions, from out of the "present" (Gegenwart), into the "future" 
(Zukunft) and back to the "past" (Gewesenheit). Primordial time 
is, therefore, understood as a holistic, non-successive manifold of 
three dimensions or "ecstasies." In the "present" I am practically 
immersed in a context of tools and others as I go about my life. 
However, my practical involvement with things is always mediated 
by the "past" and the "future," by the temporal structures of 
"situatedness" (Befindlichkeit) and "projection" (Entwurf). 
Situatedness refers to the way in which I am already "thrown" into 
a shared world, with a shared history that attunes or affects me in 
terms of particular dispositions or "moods" (Stimmung). Projec-
tion refers to the way I am always "ahead o f myself in my every-
day activities insofar as I am directed forward by future goals and 
projects, by the "for-the-sake-of-which" (das Worumwillen). It is 
only on the basis of this disclosive horizon—one that simultaneously 
reaches forward into social possibilities and projects that are "not 
yet" and hackward into a shared situation that allows things to 
count and matter in particular ways—that beings can emerge-into-
presence as such. 
Where would the lived-body fit within this twofold horizon? 
We can look at projection first. Because Entwurf captures the 
sense of Dasein as a being "on the way" or "ahead of itself it is 
fundamentally futural.36 As such, Dasein is structurally "being-
towards-the-end" or "being-towards-death" which has nothing to 
do with our bodily demise. In the bodily sense, "Dasein never per-
ishes."37 Death, therefore, does not refer to the end of a succes-
sive sequence of'now-points'. 
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The end of my Dasein, my death, is not some point at which a 
sequence of events suddenly breaks off, but a possibility which 
Dasein knows of in this or that way: the most extreme possibility 
of itself, which it can seize and appropriate as standing before 
it.38 
For Heidegger, death is a structure of disclosedness itself, indicat-
ing how human existence always moves towards the possibility of 
its own completion or fulfillment even though such fulfillment is 
impossible. As a finite movement, I am not something fundamen-
tally fixed or stable. I am more like a "not yet" because I can 
always move into different social possibilities right up until the 
moment of death. As Heidegger says, "this 'not yet' belongs to 
Dasein as long as it is." 3 9 Thus, Entwurf reveals how Dasein is a 
"being-possible," a "potentiality" or "not yet" that can never attain 
"wholeness."40 As a temporal structure that opens future 'possi-
bilities', it is hard to see how the 'actual' event of concrete "body-
ing forth" (Leiben) could be found in projection. Indeed, in his 
Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger confirms, "bodying forth does not 
occur here."4 1 
The structure of Befindlichkeit seems to be a more likely 
candidate. Again, situatedness—taken together with projection— 
constitutes Dasein's temporal openness. It is by means of projec-
tion that I already understand the world and press into future pos-
sibilities, and it is by means of situatedness that I find myself in a 
particular public situation where things affect me or matter to me 
in terms of shared dispositions. In this respect, the lived-body ap-
pears to be a necessary condition of situatedness insofar as I am 
thrown into a particular concrete situation, and this situation is dis-
closed to me in terms of specific embodied attunements. 
This may provide us with a clearer picture of Heidegger's 
claim in the Zollikon Seminars, specifically that "bodying-forth" 
should be regarded as "a necessary but not a sufficient condition" 
for any relation with the world.42 The lived-body can be interpreted 
as a 'necessary' condition for any instance of Dasein because it is 
an essential aspect of the temporal structure of situatedness. But it 
is not a 'sufficient' condition because it is nowhere to be found in 
the temporal structure of projection. Heidegger says: 
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Bodying forth (Leiben) as such belongs to being-in-the-world. 
But being-in-the-world is not exhausted in bodying forth. For 
instance, the understanding of being also belongs to being-in-
the-world.43 
If this is true, the lived-body must therefore be understood as an 
essential structure of intelligibility because it constitutes half of the 
twofold horizon of temporality. 
Does this mean, as commentators such as Brian Bowles sug-
gest, that "bodying forth" should be interpreted as isomorphic with 
"situatedness?"44 It is not so simple. First, this suggestion puts too 
much emphasis on the role of the individual subject in terms of the 
constitution of our specific attunements or moods. Furthermore, it 
fails to distinguish between my own embodied agency and the 
disclosive horizon that is already there, a horizon that gives mean-
ing to my embodied practices. We will look at each of these prob-
lems in turn. 
Heidegger's use of Stimmung is not to be understood sub-
jectively where the world meaningfully affects me in terms of 
my own psychological 'states-of-mind', being depressed, afraid, 
bored, or excited. Rather, Stimmung is the condition for the pos-
sibility of any individual disposition or mood. The mood is not in 
me, in the lived-body; I am already in a mood by virtue of my 
public involvements, by being thrown into a shared social con-
text that determines in advance the way things affect me. In short, 
mood is "like an atmosphere," already "there" prior to the emer-
gence of the lived-body, and it is by means of this atmosphere 
that my embodied engagements are attuned or disposed in one 
way or another towards things. In his 1929-30 lectures, Heidegger 
says 
Attunements are not side-effects, but are something which in 
advance determines our being with one another. It seems as 
though attunement is in each case already there, so to speak, 
like an atmosphere in which we first immerse ourselves in each 
case and which then attunes us through and through.45 
Hence, moods are both a priori and public, making it possible for 
me, as an embodied agent, to be in a mood. 
Metontology and the Body-Problem in Being and Time 11 
The dominance of the public way in which things have been 
interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities 
of having a [mood]—that is, for the basic way in which Dasein 
lets the world "matter" to it.46 
For Heidegger, moods reveal the way communal events, roles, 
occupations, and equipment already matter to us. For instance, the 
practices of a teacher, husband, or father matter to me because 
they are part of the world I am familiar with, whereas the prac-
tices of a shaman, witchdoctor, or tribal chief do not show up in 
terms of this familiar nexus of relations, and therefore they do not 
shape the future course of my life. Thus, moods disclose a basic 
temporal structure of Dasein, the structure of "alreadiness," that is 
prior to my own embodied agency. Heidegger puts it in the follow-
ing way: 
Why can I let a pure thing of the world show up at all in bodily 
presence? Only because the world is already there in thus let-
ting it show up 4 7 
It is only if our embodied acts and practices are structured by the 
past, by situatedness, that we can be attuned to the world in the 
first place. We can say the lived-body gives us access to intra-
worldly things and is, therefore, required for any human being to be 
in a mood, but the lived-body does not constitute the meaningful-
ness of moods or make them possible. Moods, like the world itself, 
are already there for us to grow into.48 
To this end, Being and Time involves two interpretations of 
Dasein. The project begins with phenomenological descriptions of 
my own embodied activities, activities that reveal a particular un-
derstanding of being, what Heidegger calls "existentiell" under-
standing. 
The question of existence never gets straightened out except 
through existence itself. The understanding of oneself which 
leads along this way we call existentiell.*9 
My worldly practices embody a particular understanding of being 
because I am invariably engaged in specific social roles that are 
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already meaningful. It is, therefore, by means of my own activities 
that I draw things into a meaningful public space. Thus, Dasein's 
individual activity opens up and sustains a clearing.50 
However, describing my own embodied understanding of be-
ing is only the first step. Heidegger's core concern is the original 
horizon of meaning itself. In this more primordial sense, Dasein is 
to be understood as the Dasein, as the "being of the-there," the 
clearing that makes meaningful bodily acts and practices possible. 
Here, the emphasis is not on the particular embodied engagements 
of the individual but on temporality as the "Da," the disclosive 
space or "openness" that lets beings show up in their being. It is 
for this reason that Heidegger, in his 1928 Leibniz lectures, refers 
to Dasein's openness as "neutral" because it is prior to the lived-
body, "prior to every factual concretion."51 It is what makes 
"bodiliness," "sexuality," and "concrete factual humanity" possible. 
As embodied agents we are already "stretching along" forward 
and backward in a meaningful, temporally structured horizon.52 
Moreover, Heidegger suggests this horizon of temporality is 
itself "made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical 
temporality temporalizes."53 In his 1927 lecture course, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger refers to this most origi-
nal form of temporality with the Latinate "Temporaiita't."54 
Temporalität is seen as the origin of any possibility whatsoever, 
and as such, it is "earlier" than any bodily comportment or indi-
vidual understanding of being.. 
Time is earlier than any possible earlier Time as the source 
of all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all possibilities as 
such in their possibility-making function have the character of 
the earlier. That is to say, they are a priori.55 
We can say, therefore, the lived-body ek-sists by "standing out-
side" itself insofar as it is already embedded in and engaged with a 
meaningful public background. As such, the embodied agent "tran-
scends" the binary of subject and object, surpassing the bound-
aries of her own skin because she is already directed towards and 
handling intra-worldly beings. But this transcendence is itself made 
possible by the horizonal unity of temporalizing. 
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As the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporalizing, temporal-
ity is the condition of the possibility of transcendence and thus 
also the condition of possibility of the intentionality that is 
founded in transcendence . . . . Temporality makes possible 
Dasein's comportment as comportment toward beings, whether 
toward itself, toward others, or toward the handy or the extent.56 
So Temporalität is understood as prior to and the condition for 
the possibility of any instance of meaningful embodied living. 
The Importance of Metontology 
Fundamental ontology, therefore, ultimately reveals Tempo-
ralität as the origin of any intelligibility, an origin stripped of all 
ontic determinations including the factical aspects of my own bodily 
nature. However, critics rightly point out that this results in a project 
that becomes increasingly "formal," "neutral," and "abstract," with-
drawing and finally severing itself from, what Heidegger refers to 
as, the "ontical priority of Dasein," the concrete starting point for 
any fundamental ontology.57 Heidegger confirms, "The results of 
the [existential] analysis show the peculiar formality and empti-
ness of any ontological determination."58 Yet, this does not mean 
Heidegger is dismissing investigations into the problem of embodi-
ment altogether. Indeed there are clues in his lectures following 
Being and Time indicating that the existential analytic opens up 
the possibility of "turning" (Kehre) back to the ontic aspects of 
Dasein, a turn now rooted in the "primal phenomenon of human 
existence itself."59 This return is not inconsistent with the position 
in Being and Time. For Heidegger, it is on the basis of the worldly, 
existentiell practices of ontic Dasein that any ontology "arises" 
and must eventually "return."60 
The nature of this "turn around" or "overturning" (Umschlag) 
is only briefly introduced in an appendix to his 1928 Leibniz lec-
tures where Heidegger distinguishes the "analytic of Dasein" from 
the "metaphysics of Dasein."61 It is on the basis of the metaphys-
ics of Dasein that philosophy can return to specific anthropological 
and ethical aspects of existence that were passed over in the exis-
tential analytic.62 In his 1929 lectures, Kant and the Problem of 
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Metaphysics, Heidegger explains that the metaphysics of Dasein 
is nothing like a "fixed" conceptual system "about" a particular 
entity, as for example "zoology is about animals." Rather, it is al-
ways transforming and being taken up anew, always working out 
the question of "what man is." 6 3 Heidegger refers to this new in-
vestigation, which re-examines the existentiell practices of Dasein, 
as "metontology" (Metontologie) 
I designate this set of questions metontology. And here also, in 
the domain of metontological-existentiell questioning, is the 
domain of the metaphysics of existence.64 
Metontology or "metaphysical ontics" (metaphysische Ontik) 
is not a reference to the ontic investigations of the positive sci-
ences. 
[MJetontology is not a summary ontic in the sense of a general 
science that empirically assembles the results of the individual 
sciences into a so-called "world picture."65 
Metontology is associated with the ontic sciences only insofar as it 
has "beings as its subject matter." In short, Dasein is now thematized 
as a being, but not in terms of its objective, present-at-hand at-
tributes. Rather, it is thematized in terms of existence. 
Metontological-existentiell questioning, therefore, is already shaped 
by the results of the analytic of Dasein. It is for this reason that 
Heidegger suggests an essential union between fundamental on-
tology and metontology. "Metontology is only possible," says 
Heidegger, "on the basis and in the perspective of the radical onto-
logical problematic and is possible conjointly with it."66 
On the metontological view of the body, the assumptions of the 
positive sciences have been dismantled, and the body is no longer 
conceived exclusively as abounded material entity that is separate 
and distinct from worldly objects. The body—now understood in 
terms of existence—is already at home, oriented in a concrete 
situation, pre-reflectively handling and manipulating a holistic total-
ity of beings. As an embodied agent I am already familiar with a 
unified, pre-given background and this embodied familiarity allows 
things—such as tools, signs, gestures, and events—to show up as 
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the very things that the are. This means body and world are not cut 
off from each other like subject and object. Rather, they always 
"belong together" in terms of Dasein.67 
At the end of Being and Time, Heidegger suggests that his 
own ontical starting point—which provides access to the question 
of the meaning of being—is only one possible path. "Whether this 
is the only way or even the right one at all," says Heidegger, "can 
be decided only after one has gone along Z/."68 Heidegger, there-
fore, recognizes his path is "limited," and it will invariably neglect 
certain factical aspects of existence.69 These aspects can be taken 
up again by metontology, by the metaphysics of Dasein. And phi-
losophy will inevitably return to the concerns of metontology be-
cause the existential analytic is itself made possible by a meta-
physics of finite historical existence.70 Indeed, as Heidegger says 
in 1929, fundamental ontology is only "the first level" of the meta-
physics of Dasein. 
The metaphysics of Dasein, guided by the question of ground-
laying, should unveil the ontological constitution of [Dasein] in 
such a way that it proves to be that which makes possible [the 
existentiell] Fundamental ontology is only the first level of 
the metaphysics of Dasein. What belongs to this [Metaphysics 
of Dasein] as a whole, and how from time to time it is rooted 
historically in factical Dasein cannot be discussed here."7' 
It can be argued that this theme endures in Heidegger. As late as 
his 1962 lecture, On Time and Being, Heidegger expressed the 
importance of repeating an analysis of the ontic aspects of Dasein 
after the "meaning of being had been clarified," features that the 
positive sciences were never able to grasp and thus had to be 
taken up in a "completely different way."72 Heidegger, On Time 
and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 
1972)32. 
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